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Abstract
Open Source Software has proved to be reliable and efficient in
many cases. Therefore the technical advantages are self-explanat-
ory. What is interesting about this work is the production model it-
self.  As will  be displayed it has a commons based structure and
arises through collective action. A general economic assumption is
that such forms of organisations own the risk to fail.  With these
conditions in mind Open Source Software  likewise should break
down. Therefore it is not so much a question of why it exists, which
might be a more ideological discussion, it is more a question of why
it is sustainable.
For that reason the conception of a commons and their failure will
be examined as well as the argument of why Open Source Software
is a kind of a commons and why it is sustainable. But firstly, as a
deeper introduction, the emphasis will be on the nature of innova-
tions and their meaning within the realm of software, especially in
the case of Open Source.
A) The Dimensions of innovations
1.) Knowledge, innovation and science
One characteristic of science, very shortly explained, is the ability
to gain knowledge using scientific methods. With this knowledge an
innovative outcome is possible. Therefore innovation is character-
ised by its application in a commercial way. Frequently a technolo-
gical innovation on or for the market initiated a historical change.
Electricity, steam engines or the telephone system are qualified ex-
amples. Therefore in these situations innovations additionally have
a social dimension.
But is science, the gaining of knowledge, chiefly an objective pro-
duction mode? Ruled and caused only by economic and rational in-
terests, whose effects on the social world are merely unintended
and accidental by-products? Surely not.
Of course not every new piece of knowledge becomes an innova-
tion. And not every innovation has an existential social impact. Nor
is it nearly impossible on a free market to research with the confid-
ent intention that the final product will change the life of people. A
general assumption is that “The more radical the invention, the less
rational and predictable” (Schon, 1982, p. 299).  Furthermore, as
we will later see, innovation often happens outside of the market,
and in some cases it is not even performed by scientists or profes-
sional researchers. Even the previously described commercial us-
ability isn't a general character anymore.
To examine its dimensions, it is possible to interpret the production
of scientific knowledge in two ways (Yearley, 1988). The first ap-
proach is  governed by the 'political  economy.'  Here the premier
motive for the development of science and technology is continually
and heavily  influenced by economic considerations. The needs of
the companies are the main cause for technical innovations. This
assumption is not very complex and only valid for the 'minority' of
innovations. The second stands for 'social constructionism.' It pro-
poses a strong social influence on the  decisions about innovation
and science. Scientific necessity alone can never be a sufficient lo-
gical  explanation for  innovation.  No  decisions about  science are
free of elements of social construction, where the development of
technology is comprehended as a social process. 
Even if both interpretations are differing in the question of impacts
and motive, both say that science is not a body of neutral know-
ledge or is  uninfluenced by social  surroundings.  And even if  we
would not agree with one of these interpretations and try to verbal-
ize our own, it makes no difference to the fact that the relationship
between science (with its  knowledges and innovations as the con-
sequence) and society is very mutual. There is no unbalanced de-
pendence, both fructify each other.
As argued technological systems are “socially produced” (Castells,
2002, p. 36) and show much more complexity if they are not only
regarded within the scope of science or economy. Similar to this
discussion is the question of whether the  character of innovation
could be defined as supply-pushed or  as  demand-led.  This more
economic  point  of  view  deals  with  the  distinction  of  scientific
motives. It suggests theories about the market where supply and
demand are important factors. Indeed new knowledge and innova-
tions are a crucial part in economic deliberation. It sustains and
supports competition in free markets. The (economic) development
of companies, organisations or even countries is  decisively influ-
enced by their ability  to create innovations. Particularly  with re-
gard to the post-industrial society the process of transformation is
interacting with science and research. The attribute of “creative
destruction” (Schumpeter, 1994) still is an applicable characterisa-
tion of the potentialities of innovations, no matter if in a scientific,
economic or social sphere.
2.)Software as an example of the different dimensions of innova-
tions
It is possible to deduce, therefore, that innovations scrutinize exist-
ing organisations and structures and their strengths. They have to
create innovations and  maintain these if they want to continue in
their existence. This challenge concerns many spheres and is espe-
cially more  widespread and weightier since the age of modernity.
Even  if  the  circumstances  these  days  is  the  post-industrial,  the
post-modern or the information age (whatever the best expression
might be) have changed, the conditions are basically the same in
this case.
Good examples for the post-industrial society can be found in in-
formation technology,  software and computer economy.  Or,  as  a
more general and colourful expression, the 'digital world.' They are
characterised by the central importance of information and know-
ledge as raw materials and goods. This has been enabled by elec-
tronic data processing and communication networks.  Because of
this the production of material goods becomes more and more in-
consequential. Crucial  to the creation of value is the intelligence
which flows into the creation of the product. The tendency towards
the centreing of knowledge in the economy of OECD countries is
measurable1. Beside these quantitative reasons there are qualitat-
ive ones (Zimmermann, 2004) which indicate that the information
technologies are more than only a technical innovation. Their usab-
ility is universal, their application in every imaginable part of the
economy led to a change  compared with the industrial or Fordism
production mode.
To express it in scientific terms, beside labour, natural resources
and  capital,  digitalized  knowledge  can be  considered  here as  a
factor  of  production.  The  evolution  of  industrial  production  has
reached a point where nearly every physical product can be pro-
duced in any desired quantity at little expense. Therefore, the im-
portance of the labour factor is decreasing within these product-
ively coordinated production processes. Of course labour and nat-
ural resources still matter, but their meaning is changing under the
influence of (digitalized) knowledge as a factor of production. From
this point of view the information technologies have another eco-
nomical and social effect. They furthermore optimize the produc-
tion mode and offer an alternative sphere for human employment.
Hence innovations in the development processes of software have
far-reaching effects.  Fundamentally changes likewise occur in so-
cial systems, structures and procedures (Castells, 2000),  because
software is one of the main 'tools' within the realm of the informa-
tion and data processing, the information technologies, and its eco-
nomic behaviour is different to the classical assumptions about util-
isation or production.
1 more informations and data can be found in OECD's annual report 2004
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/49/31621929.pdf
For example transaction costs, marginal costs or scarcity have less
importance  in  information  centred economic  areas.  Software
products theoretically are no exception in this case. The transac-
tion costs are low, because software is easy to merchandise. Mar-
ginal costs have no significant importance here as the total costs
won't increase notably if the number of units produced increases.
This is because scarcity is an unknown phrase if a digital copy can
be produced with the same quality as the original but without re-
markable costs. Digital products have a 'virtual nature' (Zimmer-
mann, 2004).
Software is an example of innovation where its nature introduce
new rules which challenge economic and social structures. Origin-
ally  a merely scientific issue, software became important in eco-
nomic and social spheres too. Its acceptance is prevalent such that
these spheres influence each other. But the primary overspill oc-
curred from science to economy and finally to a social dimension.
By the universal use of software, boundaries between these spheres
begin to disappear and reciprocal relationships evolve. The output
of one part of this relationship can be the input of the other.
Software determines the scope of action for people that have to
work with digitalized data. It is an interface (Zimmermann, 2004)
between user,  data  and machine.  The possibilities a user has to
work with his data are limited by the complexity of functions which
the software provides him to work with. This thesis combined with
the  aforementioned  assumption,  that  information  technology  in
general and software in particular pervades a major part of eco-
nomy and even everyday life, is a fundamental aspect about the so-
cial coherences of software as a technological innovation. The im-
pact of computer applications on people's life is substantial and in-
fluences their choice to engage in what information technology has
to offer.
The argument should have shown that software plays a, more or
less, important role in social and economic models. The specifics in
the manner of  production, distribution and use of software have
been discussed. In this context it is interesting to have a look at
Open Source Software.  This  subsystem with its  open production
processes and open codes promises to provide new solutions to the
use and production of software.
3.) Open Source Software in particular
Open Source  Software  has  an  attraction  which  goes  beyond its
technological advantages. Here the innovative characteristic can be
considered as  even more multifaceted and greater  than what  is
called  closed source software.  Everything debated before was  a
concept of software in general. A concept with the least common
denominator, every kind of software is, less or more, fulfilling it. In
most  cases  closed  source  software  is  not  going  beyond  this
concept.
But Open Source Software has this ability, even if it is only a sub-
system,  one  part  of  the  information  technology  paradigm,  it  is
powerful enough to be regarded as a social movement inside this
paradigm. Before we argue about this thesis, it is necessary to clas-
sify Open Source Software in relation to closed source software in
order  to  define  them.  Both are  subsystems of  the  already  men-
tioned paradigm. So what is their relation? Is Open Source Soft-
ware only a subsystem in a subsystem? Surely not, this would mean
that closed source software is identical to the nature of software in
general. And that is not true. Open Source Software is not a supple-
ment to closed source software. It is an independent domain and de
facto equivalent to closed source software. The differences are not
in the content  or in the scale,  they are in the attitudes towards
openness and economic interests. Therefore it is logical to put both
on the same level.
The differences are crucial and sufficient enough to speak about
Open Source Software  as  a  social  movement.  If  we think about
these kind of  phenomena we tend to think about something like
the Labour movement or the Environmental movement. Of course
in this case it is a very  specialised, small-scaled and finite move-
ment, but on the other hand it is a quite active, creative and suc-
cessful one. The origins comply with the similar suppositions of any
other  social  movement.  “When traditional  norms no  longer  suc-
ceed, in providing a satisfactory structure for behaviour, the indi-
vidual is forced to challenge the social order through various forms
of non-conformity. A social movement develops when a feeling of
dissatisfaction spreads,  and insufficiently  flexible  institutions are
unable to respond” (della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 6). 
This quote gives an adequate overview and should cover our in-
terests as well as the already mentioned 'classical movements.' Fur-
thermore the authors have listed four characteristic aspects (della
Porta & Diani, 1999) which are defining this kind of movement. The
first are the informal interaction networks. Second there have to be
shared beliefs and solidarity. The third characteristic is that collect-
ive action is focussed on conflicts which is followed by the fourth
one where the use of protest stands in the centre of interest. The
first two aspects seem to be self-explanatory as they deal with basic
conditions about the structure and their motives. Numbers three
and four have a closer view on the action of social movements. The
phrases  'conflict'  and  'protest'  might  be  mistaken. Here  conflict
means  providing  an  alternative and  facing  the  opposition.  The
forms of protests are manifold. By choosing the GPL (GNU Public
Licence)  for  licensing the  software  could  already  considered  a
protest. An obvious example is the open protest against software
patents.
Following  this  argument  the  question now is  what  makes  Open
Source Software a social movement? Or to put it another way, what
is  so special  about  it  (beside possible  technological  excellence)?
What is the reason for its social innovative nature?
The techniques to produce innovations are different in comparison
to the dominating methods where private proprietary rights in the
field of innovations exist. In the world of Open Source,  within a
non-commercial context, people contribute voluntarily to common
goods. Software is not necessarily the only example for this type of
innovation production. The transfer of this production model is pos-
sible and is already applied in other areas. The Wikipedia as a fam-
ous representative for the Wikis is a perfect example. Or the Trop-
ical Disease Initiative with the approach to reduce the costs of dis-
covering  and  developing  remedies  for  tropical  diseases  ('Open
Source Drug Discovery')2.   All  these projects have vital  things in
common,  they  are  voluntarily  produced  collective  innovations
without restrictive private proprietary rights (at least for the most
part, in any case). The examples introduced all function outside of
the pure logic of market systems. And for the adoption of this mod-
el for economic use, the persons responsible have to be aware of
these conditions. It works in situations where the profit of the con-
tributors is greater than their costs (Osterloh et al., 2004).
In a classical Open Source environment one important characterist-
ic is the voluntariness. A predominant characteristic in an econom-
ic environment is  rationality.  Both are not in contrast with each
other,  but  they  have  different  importance  within  their  environ-
ments.
The production of Open Source Software (or other examples which
act like it) basically happens outside of conventional economic con-
straints, even if the strategy of some projects tends to behave more
in economic ways. The user oriented usability project of KDE3 or
the  marketing  project  of  OpenOffice.org4 are  just  two  such  ex-
amples among many. But in general the production and the devel-
opment of these projects works without special  economically de-
termined rules. And if they do, they do it with the characteristics of
Open Source.
The motives for this are more complex than simply the difference
between successful  and unsuccessful.  In  this  case  the  most  fre-
quent motives for the voluntary work have an intrinsic nature (Her-
tel et al., 2003). The work itself isn't understood as a factor of pro-
duction, it is more a “highly qualified non-work” (Holtgrewe, 2000,
p. 3). Lakhani and others have characterised (Lakhani et al., 2002)
four groups of Open Source developers: 'learning and stimulation'
oriented (29 %), 'hobbyists' (27 %), 'professionals' (25 %) and 'com-
munity believers' (19 %). This characterisation shows that in  most
cases the developer of Open Source Software is an unpaid volun-
teer. The interests are centred around the project itself and not so
much around the benefits which might result from the project (ex-
trinsic motives) for the developer. In this context the acquisition of
2 http://www.tropicaldisease.org/index.html
3 http://usability.kde.org/
4 http://marketing.openoffice.org/
reputation, as an example for extrinsic motivation, is not a major
stimulus (in contradiction to Raymond, 1999). It has been surveyed
(Ghosh et al.,  2002) that for only 9.1 % of the developers it is a
reason to join an Open Source community because of establishing
their reputation.
The actions of the economy are based on rational deliberations. The
aspiration for profit is the motive for these deliberations. Therefore
their structures are dominated by extrinsic motives. A volunteer de-
veloper of Open Source Software is free to behave irrationally (in
an economic sense). A company can't afford the luxury to deliber-
ately behave in a  similar way.
The nature of companies and the nature of Open Source Software
(or Open Invention at all) are oppositional in many ways. But obvi-
ously this model seems to be attractive enough that efforts have
been made to enforce this ideal, for the very reason that a classical
market economy has always been faced with the danger of market
failures, so it has always tried to solve this problem. As an alternat-
ive the example of Open Source Software shows that innovation
and production outside of the markets is possible. Some theoreti-
cians regard these advantages under a Marxist point of view where
innovations now are undocked from economic constraints and ex-
ploitations, which is the direct consequence of the fact that know-
ledge,  as a  factor  of  production,  is  free for everyone  and not a
tradeable commodity  anymore (Gorz,  2002).  It  is seen here as a
challenging social  model  inside  the  information  society.  The  de-
termining factor 'inside' is decisive here, which will  be explained
later.
As we can see, the ideologies within Open Source are very multidi-
mensional. Even the concept itself offers the possibility to be re-
defined from different perspectives. Today the pragmatic term of
'Open Source Software' is quite common. In contradiction to this
approach many  activist  prefer  to  use  the  more idealistically  af-
fected perception of 'Free Software.' No matter if the concept is re-
garded as 'Free' or 'Open', the model itself is based upon mutually
reliant  specific  social  and  technical  requirements  (Holtgrewe,
2004). Social requirements are of course not as easy adoptable as
technical ones. For economic use it is important to reflect upon the
mutual characteristic of Open Source Software. Even if the com-
mercial interests are mainly on the technical characteristic, the in-
novation must not be regarded as a 'Black Box.' The peer review by
the community is the crucial point. Otherwise a community  would
not be anything other than a group of consumers.
But as it is already difficult to pinpoint exactly why the innovation
model of Open Source Software is successful, it is even more com-
plicate to predict where else it could work. As mentioned before
there are existing interests from societal and economic positions.
As a social movement it is limited within the boundaries of the tech-
nological sphere of the information society. It would hardly be ap-
plicable outside of this digitalised world of this information society.
In this context it is likely that this technological system is able to
avoid inefficiency if it  concentrates itself on the necessary work,
the creation of knowledge and innovation in the form of software
(Tuomi, 2002). Any further attempt to use it in a societal context
would be unemployable.
The idea behind Open Source Software functions inside the produc-
tion of technological artefacts. Other similar working projects like
the briefly mentioned Wikis are aware of this circumstance. Even if
they don't look very technological on the first view, at a closer in-
spection they are. It is not so much the content of an Open Source
(or Open Invention, Open Content, etc) movement that ensures the
success of the idea. It is so much more convincing because of the
technological environments. These environments are vital for two
reasons. Because they can be new and innovative in themselves,
and because they provide a perfect production platform which is (in
most cases) easy to use and accessible for almost everyone who is
interested. That's why 'Open' products exist, because they are tech-
nological products or at least  produced with the help of them.
The form of the content (the form of the invention) can be variable,
but in actual fact it is all about technical innovation. With these de-
liberations in mind, it becomes more clear that many economically
targeted firms and companies  are exceedingly  interested in  this
model, because technical innovations are a classic domain of the
economy, and as mentioned before the alternative innovation pro-
cess of Open Source Software promises benefits while at the same
time minimizing failures and investments.  But  the economic use
could be complicated  if  the  interested firms are  not  aware  that
“Open source / free software is by design a process rather than a
product” (Holtgrewe & Werle, 2001, p. 61).
Of course the idea to produce something through collaborative ac-
tion and share or provide it as free for everybody isn't really new.
Even the concept of Open Source Software is as old as the first
computers. But in contradiction to the 'classical' collective actions,
here a public good is produced with different attributes. For ex-
ample the state plays absolutely no role in production, distribution
or maintaining of this public good. At least not within the context of
welfare. And the question of the ownership is different as well as
the technical accessibility. These points, among others, will be dis-
cussed later.
For now it is more interesting to see that Open Source Software ex-
ists for totally different reasons other than 'classical' public goods.
It exists not only because of the non-excludable attribute and the
absence of scarcity and to profit from it. Nor is it defined by the
idea of welfare. It is the characteristic of the alternative that makes
this product so special, compared to others. By its characteristics it
is not possible to commercialize them (remember – this is a particu-
lar feature of the classical assumption of a public good – think of
environmental goods like fresh air, fishing grounds or even the law
enforcement  as  a  further  example),  but  Open  Source  Software
owns other qualities. It stands in competition with other software
like closed source software or even Open Source Software in some
cases. And it is possible to adopt a business idea around it.
The collective action as a production mode is a common way to pro-
duce public goods. Even if the usage and the production of it im-
plies a certain mass of technical knowledge, it is basically nothing
new. But what is new can be found inside the production and the
usage. All the social and technical network effects, the social norms
and structures or the answers on the questions about organisation
and leadership. The communities  which arose around the projects
are  exceptional  and extraordinary.  The  organisation  is  a  crucial
point. Public goods and private goods have a tendency to fail and
produce inefficiency under a poorly directed organisation. The free-
rider problem on the one side and market failures on the other are
threats for the respective systems. 
But Open Source Software can evade these threats. It might be be-
cause of the special position it has. Under this aspect it is  worth-
while to have a closer look on the area of tension between public
goods and conventional economic behaviour. To understand their
relationship can be very useful for looking into the innovation and
production process of Open Source Software. 
Here the social dimension is affected by its very special collective
action. Because the collective actions produce 'Common-Pool Re-
sources' (Hess & Ostrom, 2003) or could be even self considered as
a  common-pool  resource.  Furthermore  this  phrase  is  more  ad-
equate in this case than the notion of public goods. That's why it is
necessary to define it in detail and to have a look at possible disad-
vantages and threats. These explorations and assumptions will be
considered under the perception of Open Source Software. It is ad-
ministrable to look at the concept from this perspective simply to
try to comprehend why it works the way it does. Why the common-
pool resources won't be abused as has happened to many systems
of commons before.
B) Commons based systems and Open Source Software
1.) The system of the commons
The idea of the commons is a very old one as well as it is multifa-
ceted. The basic categories deal with the terms of access, use or
consumption in the context of property. Theorists of the commons
have been talking about these categories, its values and meanings
for a long time. In this context it shouldn't be forgotten that the
idea of property has altered in the history of mankind. The ques-
tions about what is  common, what is public and what is private
property have been answered in many different ways. And to make
it even more complicated, these answers have been interpreted and
transformed by world views and ideologies like, beside many others
of course, liberalism, communism or conservatism.
Therefore  it  makes  sense  to  start  with  finding  some  common
ground on which it is possible to base the theories of law, politics,
economy and the experiences of their history. That will help us to
understand what special position the concept of Open Source Soft-
ware holds within the theories of the commons.
The concept of the commons is very interesting for historians. Even
though it is much older, the commons established in the mediaeval
times as a useful and prospering system to manage resources. It
was a working economic system based, in most cases, on a piece of
land, meadow, lake, river or pasture. Although the nature of the
commons and its definition can be different in different communit-
ies or countries, they often include natural resources as a basis.
Another  important  characteristic  is  that,  despite  the  fact  it  is  a
common resource, it does not mean there is no owner for that re-
source. It is a freehold in possession of the village, a part of the as-
set of the community where members of that community are al-
lowed to use it. And this is the next crucial point.
In the original concept of the commons the access to it is only avail-
able for the locals. The residents of other communities or strangers
did not had the right to use it or to benefit from it. But the question
of access and the rights to use what and how can be different even
inside these traditional commons. Because there often existed sev-
eral kinds of rights. These resources can be either used by all mem-
bers of the community or only by a few. Another way to organise
these common resources was to determine which rights a user had.
For example he might have had the right to pasture his sheep but
he was not allowed to take sods of turf.
That shows how aware the communities were (even at this time)
about possible disorders. But it was more than a simple opposition
to  private  property.  The idea  of  common resources,  or  common
property in general, owned by the community and therefore equally
by all members, is the attempt to benefit from a special type of pub-
lic good. The differences between commons and public goods have
been quite often discussed differentially. Simply because of the fact
that the boundaries between them are fluctuating, as we will see
later. But it should be possible to describe the commons as a subset
of public goods. Because it is not infinite but replenishable. That
means the communities had to use it deliberately if they wanted to
keep it working. They recognised that  the number of users had to
be limited. So only locals could utilise it and sometimes even only
under restrictions.
Additionally  the  law  provides  administrable  informations  about
these assumptions. 6 Halbury's Laws (4th edn) para 507 (Saunders,
1996) lists rights of common, which have their origin in common
law. Rights of common are either a) appendant (to seize a certain
land from another's ground, but holding it in common and use it
only under specific conditions), b) appurtenant (land annexed by an
adjacent landowner, to hold it in common), c) in gross (a landown-
er, by his deed, grant to another that he have common in his land),
or d) by reason of vicinage (commoners of adjoining certain lands
allow each other to let their cattle stray over the dividing boundar-
ies)(Greenberg & Millbrook, 2000). These rights show how sophist-
icated the system of the commons has been in some regions and
how the common law created economic sustainable structures. Un-
der these conditions the law provides its definition of the tradition-
al commons. 6 Halsbury's Laws (4th edn) para 505 (Saunders, 1996)
simply defines it as a “the land where rights of common are exer-
cised.”
What we have seen up to now is a structure for an agricultural soci-
ety. The idea of the commons still exists, but it has to face different
rules  and  conditions.  Nevertheless  the  contemporary  common
property theory still has its own character. “Common property re-
gimes are  an alternative regulatory  model  to private  and public
ownership” (Cahir, 2003, p. 18).
It could be a thesis that in a time where the Mercantilism was the
predominant  economic  theory,  common  property  regimes  were
able to prosper (Engel, 2002). However there are a lot of doubts for
economists about the strengths of these regimes in times of inter-
national division of labour and free floating currencies. At this the
rights of disposal have to be defined absolutely, simply because of
the  precise,  fast  and effective  control  over  the allocation  of  re-
sources.
For this economic point of view a system of a common property
would be more than irrational, it would be a danger for the prop-
erty.  Because  it  is  considered  as  risky  if  the  rights  of  disposal
would be diluted. Although often regarded as a threat, the dilution
is not per se a dysfunction. But most companies, for example, dis-
like the idea. They fear that, with diluted rights of disposal, others
could adopt the use of their product (property) apart from the mar-
ket. As a direct consequence of it, the incentive for the owner of the
product to invest more efforts in the production or the maintenance
of that product is decreasing.
These  difficulties,  which  will  be  discussed  more  precisely  later,
won't be ignored in modern theories about the commons. But the
basic approach has  changed.  To satisfy  the  requirements of  the
markets property law has to be constituted. Of course there is no
doubt about the question if there should be private property. “This
does not mean that commons are anarchic spaces. Purely free ac-
tion is illusory“ (Benkler, 2003, p. 6). But what are commons today?
At first the characteristic of freedom is probably is very important
one. The freedom can be described as the ability to act outside of
market constraints.
Property laws, for example, are such a market constraint. For the
implementation of rights of disposal, property laws are necessary.
No one would doubt that.  However,  the commons,  on the other
side,  simply  tries  to offer  resources to its  users,  but  with other
rules than the free market has. Its institutions and arrangements
are different. In the commons, exclusive control over the usage of a
resource  can't  be  owned  by  a  single  person.  This  arrangement
works if four types of the commons, which are based on two para-
meters, can be discerned (Benkler, 2003).
The first parameter distinguishes if the commons is open to anyone
or to a certain group (open commons vs limited access commons).
The  second  parameter  differentiates  between  regulated  and
unregulated systems. For  Benkler every  system of  the commons
can be defined along this classification. Here the characteristic of
freedom is increased if the classification aligns towards an unregu-
lated system with open access. Whereas limited access is merely
regarded as a common property regime.
Lessig (a jurist as well as Benkler) discerns the same parameters,
but he introduces a rating whereby the precondition of access has a
higher importance (Lessig, 1999). Regulations are allowed, in some
cases they have to happen (for the most part,  it  makes sense to
think about norms in the case of governing or regulating). But the
open access to the property that is hold in a commons is the es-
sence of the commons. These kinds of property shouldn't be held or
controlled by private hand.
This openness is a crucial point because it has a great influence on
the establishing of network effects. Network effects can be identi-
fied as a good substructure for the commons (Rose, 2003). They ap-
pear if a service of a network has a higher value to a member the
more other members of that network use this service. These syner-
gies in the network effects are also known as network externalities.
And  open  access  promotes  these  externalities.  The  number  of
people who use a service, a product, a land or a good determines
the value it has for the people. Or spoken like a  Marxist theoreti-
cian, these externalities increase the use value of a product, while
in some cases (not in  all)  it  decreases the exchange value.  And
these examples can be predestinated for the use as a commons. But
it is going a bit too far for the moment. We will discuss that point
later and go back to contemporary common property theory.
The nature of  a good is  often characterised as either private or
public.  That difference is  easy to explain for economists. Private
good has the ability to solve problems very efficiently on the mar-
ket. Everything else, where it is not possible to manage with the
help of a market, needs to be produced or protected by the state as
a public good. For that reason, nobody can be excluded from a pub-
lic good. That is basically its most conspicious feature.
A public good is an appropriate example for uncompleted rights of
disposal. Three main causes can be found where rights of disposal
deliberately stay uncompleted and a public good arises. The first
reason occurs if it is technically impossible to commodify a good
(e.g. the air). At the second point it is technically possible to com-
modify a good, but it would be too expensive to implement it, think
about streets for instance. The third reason can be a political one.
In some particular cases it is possible to commodify a good as well
as it is possible to implement it. But the legal system won't allow it
because the state has a monopoly on it. That happens in situations
where a market failure could cause serious problems for certain
communities or even the society in general. Organ trade or prisons
would be eligible examples (Engel, 2002).
It should be apparent now that a commons shows many similarities
with public goods. Therefore it is not unusual that a commons can
be a public good at the same time. But to show the differences it is
useful to introduce another theory. Common-pool resources, a term
mainly established by the political scientist Elinor Ostrom,  refines
the idea of the commons for contemporary conditions  and helps to
clarify the deviations from the system of the public goods.
It has the same quality as a public good where it is unable to ex-
clude users from the benefits. But the commons, or more modern
expressed the common-pool resources, likewise own characteristics
of private goods. Not within the context of private property,  but
within the context of consumption. “The products or resource units
from  common-pool  resources  share  with  what  economists  call
'private  goods'  the attribute  that  one person's  consumption sub-
tracts  from  the  quantity  available  to  others”  (Hess  &  Ostrom,
2003).
A common-pool resource shows attributes from both sides. It is not
possible to completely assign it to one side of the dichotomy. That
might  be  the  reason  why  economists  have  problems  with  the
concept  of  the  commons.  They  usually  categorise  it  as  a  public
good. Even if it is actually not correct, it is not vital in situations
where  common-pool  resources  are  defining  a  piece  of  land  or
something very abstract like the air. Until now all these concepts
had a conception about physical products, what can be traced back
to the historical fact, where the origin is located. But how do theor-
ies  of  the  commons  behave  in  cases  where  knowledge  is  the
product? The differentiation from classical public and private prop-
erty regimes has to be done more accurately.
The rules are changing if we speak about knowledge as a common-
pool resource. Especially digital knowledge demands to scrutinise
previous assumptions. And Open Source Software is the best ex-
ample for that kind of commons.
2.) Open Source Software and the commons of knowledge
Knowledge as a common-pool resource, as a product of collective
action, owns a very special character. Because intellectual property
has a different nature than property in goods. Here there are other
conditions to produce, to trade or to maintain it. The alternatives to
allocate resources are more manifold than with other sorts of prop-
erty.  Open Source Software is a perfect example for that thesis.
The innovation model and the collective action makes it a kind of
prototype for a new, a 'present-day commons.' “Open source is an
innovation model that challenges conventional views that innova-
tion  is  best  supported  by  strong  private  intellectual  property
rights” (Osterloh & Rota, 2004, p. 3).
In  traditional  production  modes  distinctions  are  drawn  between
users and manufacturers of an innovation. These categories will be
constructed under the aspect of who benefits from what. If you be-
nefit from using the innovation, you are an user. If you benefit from
producing it, you are the manufacturer (and so on). These categor-
ies are named 'functional classes' (von Hippel, 1988). The econom-
ist Eric von Hippel has researched about the so called user innova-
tion theory, where all functional classes can be sources of innova-
tions (von Hippel, 2005). He invokes many examples like the tract-
or shovel or plastics additives. According to that user innovation is
not merely a theory for intellectual property regimes.
But the fact that makes, in this context, the case of Open Source
Software interesting is that the process of innovation happens col-
lectively. It is a 'private-collective' model of innovation (von Hippel
& von Krogh, 2003) where the participants invest their private re-
sources  and create  a  commons.  This  collective  model  is  termed
private  in  order  to  distinguish it  from classical  collective  action
models, where the existence of a central agent is possible (for ex-
ample a company or the state), who grants selective incentives (Os-
terloh & Rota, 2004). 
Similar to that theory is what Benkler describes a commons-based
peer  production  (Benkler,  2002)  for  information  systems  which
have the ability of a decentralized collaborative production mode.
This is a process where the creative energy of participating indi-
viduals leads to a joint effort that creates products of information.
These actions are not administrated by tools of the market.  The
price for example is not a regulative signal.  The commons-based
peer  production  is  a  model  different  from  markets  or  firms.  It
seems to be a derivative  of the user innovation approach, but it
merely concentrates on the information economy.
Such a commons-based peer production is predicated on the funda-
mentals of what sociologists of science (e.g. Parsons, Popper, Luh-
mann)  call  the norms of  science.  What  is  interesting within  the
framework  of  common-pool  resources  and  commons-based  peer
production is that they mainly require the segregation of science
and state, ideas and interests, as well as the segregation of know-
ledge and property. The last argument has been extended by the
sociologist Robert K. Merton as he postulates that the results of re-
search have to be published, free for anyone. This has to be done to
facilitate a peer review process, which allows others to validate the
results.  Merton  called  this  postulation  the  norm  of  communism
(Grassmuck, 2004).
Especially the norm of communism is fundamental for the informa-
tion commons. Its  application can be prototypically  found in the
area of Open Source Software where this norm is even part of most
of their licences. The process of peer review requests open access
in order to collaborate and build on each other's work. A digital en-
vironment seems to be the best place for it.
The nature of Open Source Software  interprets the norm of com-
munism new. As a common-pool resource, it has its own character-
istics. That's for sure, Open Source Software is standing between
the  realm of  public  and private  good.  But  the similarity  with  a
private good merely is the attribute that it can be made for profit.
Whereas  the  consumption  of  one  person  does  not  reduce  the
chance of another person's consumption. It is not a res extra com-
mercium, it is not outside of any potential economic transaction.
The conditions are different here.
Giving information away does not mean to the donator he will lose
the information (the 'product'). And he won't lose the rights of dis-
posal with it, except he gave it away by contract. That is the same
situation with the code of software. And the suppositions are chan-
ging again if we start from the assumption that information, as well
as the code of software, can be published with the help of the inter-
net. If the access to these information products is open to everyone,
a system of information commons arose. As it can be seen within
the example of Open Source Software.
The property is nonrival, because it is digital. The marginal costs
are  zero.  It  is  not  a  physical  product,  not  a  physical  commons.
Rivalry is not part of the concept if software is open. Ones and zer-
os are infinitely available.  The internet makes publishing source
code or information as easy as never before. Open access, the most
important requirement for a veritable system of a commons, can be
easily complied within digitalized information commons.
As described many concepts are, partially or entirely, adaptable on
Open Source Software. The ideas of user innovation, collective in-
vention,  common-pool resources or commons-based peer produc-
tion depict a structure where it seems to profit from all the advant-
ages while  avoiding the disadvantages. Simpler  expressed “open
code creates a commons” (Lessig, 2002, p. 68). The combination of
this absolute openness with other characters of the commons, and
the digital platform of the internet established a special case where
traditional  assumptions  about  common-pool  resources  or  public
goods aren't valid anymore.
To regard Open Source Software as a pure public good means to
regard closed source software as a market failure. Both presump-
tions are not right. But physical common property resources (not
the air or fishing grounds for example) exist because of a market
failure. The market has not found a way to allocate these resources
efficiently in order to produce them as a private good. That is the
general theory. But software is not a real physical product. At least
not real enough to comply with that theory. And on the other hand
software  is  not  discarnate  enough  to  be  unable  to  trade  it  (of
course here we speak about Open Source Software – anything else
isn't really admirable). And you can apply licences to it, which clari-
fies the rights of disposal.
The collective use (the collective action) of resources like know-
ledge and information can lead to a greater benefit (norm of com-
munism) than an exclusive use (Weber, 2004). It should be trans-
parent now that this thesis is adaptable on Open Source Software.
But the inversion of this thesis does not automatically mean exclus-
ive use leads to an under-utilizing of a resource. This market failure
of the anticommons (Heller, 1997) occurs when the rights of dis-
posal are too closely defined. The rights of exclusion will lead to an
inefficient use of a scarce resource. However software is no scarce
resource. Within the realm of closed source software the rights of
disposal might be defined too close in some cases but that won't in-
evitably lead to a 'classical' market failure. It is another example
how difficult it is to describe digital products with economic theor-
ies which have been created in the context of physical products.
Therefore many companies and firms try to 'reconquer' the product
from digital rules and install strict licences or use patents as pro-
tective tools.
This strategy turns software into a physical good. Instead of con-
forming economic theories to software, here software will be adap-
ted to economic constraints. This strategy is the paradigm for the
major part of software. The advantage is that it makes it easier to
trade with software, to earn money, to create incentives.
Under the perspective of the commons it is quite clear that this is
not the only alternative.  But entrepreneurs react with doubts on
the idea of an economic strategy based on common-pool resources,
even in the case of software production. The reason is a market
failure from the traditional assumption about the commons.
3.) About failures and tragedies – the reason why no commons
Common-pool  resources  are  not  sustainable.  That's  the  general
opinion from most of the theoreticians of economics. They explain it
with rational analyses. Overexploitation and free riding would be
unavoidable effects. The conflict between the interests of individu-
als and the common good is likewise attractive for the science of
political  philosophy.  To  determine  the  moral  basis  of  individual
private property they go back to the rationalistic nature of men and
to the state of nature where resources were held in common. But it
was a biologist who gave the problem a well-established name. In
1968 Garrett Hardin wrote an article about the commons and intro-
duced the colourful metaphor of the “Tragedy of the commons.”
Property related market failures basically have two causales (En-
gel, 2002). The rights of disposal on a property can be defined too
completely or not completely enough. The second case is connected
with the “tragedy of the commons.” The first case is the “tragedy of
the anticommons” (Heller, 1997). Instead of overusing a resource,
it will be under-utilised. The transaction costs of an economic ex-
change of that resource are high priced, it won't be used anymore.
That can be a problem if, for example, it is not worth to develop a
technology further because the innovator has to buy too many li-
cences (Osterloh et al., 2004). If multiple owners each have a right
to  exclude  others  from  using  a  resource,  the  transaction  costs
might be higher than the expected profit. “Transaction costs are
positive,  and  the  greater  the  number  and  complexity  of
negotiations, the higher the transaction costs” (Hope, 2004, p. 36).
As a result the resource remains unused. 
Although markets are considered as the best place to efficiently or-
ganise production and to allocate goods, they can fail as we have
seen. Economists take that problem seriously,  corrections have to
be done. But for them a failure in the commons seems to be more
fatal, because regulating institutions from the market are not exist-
ing. A conflict appears in the efficiency of distribution. This form of
economic organisation will be confronted with overuse and free rid-
ing.
Under  the assumption of  an individual  as a  Homo Oeconomicus
who is always looking for the most advantageous option, he will ex-
ploit an ungoverned good, hold in a commons, as much as he can
because he expects the others will act in the same way. Addition-
ally it is likely that a free rider problem will occur if consumers of a
common-pool  resource take  advantage  of  it  without  contributing
adequately to the creation of this resource. From this point of view
the economic nature of men seems to inhibit the idea of a success-
ful commons. But it is for sure that human behaviour and acting is
not as simple as described. For example private welfare or social
work would not exist under these assumptions. The economic and
strategic behaviour of men or organisations is more complex.
This paradox is a social dilemma, a social conflict situation. The op-
timal state of a group (a commons) is violated by merely individual,
egoistic actions. Everyone knows they benefit if everybody cooper-
ates. But at the same time everyone is aware about the fact that a
non-cooperative  behaviour  of  a  group member  would  lead  to  a
higher benefit for him then a cooperative behaviour. However (the-
oretically) no one knows the strategy of the other group members
and no one has enough information about the resource itself. It is
not clear how long the resource will be sustainable under non-co-
operative behaviour. The date of exhaustion is unknown.
These  conditions create a situation where a  rational  choice per-
formance is most attractive. Likewise other dilemma (e.g. Braess'
paradox,  prissoner's  dilemma)  the  problem  with  the  commons
shows that individual and rational decisions can lead to suboptimal
results for the collective. The commons seems to be opposing the
nature of men - sustainability needs a regulative institution.
The state of nature has always been an important concept within
the political philosophy. It is used to describe the situation and the
condition for men if there is no such regulative institution. Depend-
ing on the philosopher's conception of man, the state of nature is a
starting point for a society and can be used to explain the genesis
of a state (as the social contract theories do for example). Thomas
Hobbes depicted the state of nature in his 1651 published “Leviath-
an” as a kind of war. As he wrote it is a 'bellum omnium contra
omnes.' It is a very pessimistic view on a structure which could be
compared with a commons. Although the individuals act rationally
and look for peace, within the state of nature they live in an ever-
lasting war about resources and products. “Hereby it is manifest,
that during the time man live without a common Power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre;
and such a warre, as is of every man against every man” (Hobbes,
1968, p. 185). Every product, good or resource is hold in a com-
mons, property rights does not exist. And struggle about them oc-
curs because everyone is equal in mind and power while everyone
is trying to allocate the common-pool resources. Those who want to
respect the rules have to fear others, who do not respect them.
That's why it is a rational strategy within the state of nature to ig-
nore the rules or contracts. This set of options for action can be in-
terpreted a social dilemma. Common-pool resources create unsure
legal positions if everybody ignores the rules. The individual action
inside a collective disables an optimal condition. An optimum (or at
least a better situation than the state of nature) for Hobbes can be
found with the help of a 'common Power', a Leviathan.
Adam Smith on the other side pursued a more moral approach. He
contradicts  the  idea  of  the  commons  as  well,  but  opposing  to
Hobbes he had a more complex perception of the human nature.
The sympathy we have for our fellow men is the basis for our mor-
ale. And this would be the stimulus for human work (Smith, 1982).
In other words the people have to foster there own reputation, es-
tablish relations with other people and try to respect their needs.
The reason why they should do so is quite simple. Because of the
market. Within Hobbes' state of nature the individuals had to get,
had to produce everything they wanted by themselves. For Smith it
is part of the rational nature that people use resources or produce
goods with the help of division of labour. Relations are important. It
is necessary to follow rules. “It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 1994).
There is no place for a commons because under rational conditions
a market would evolve instead of establishing a common-pool re-
sources.  The  efficiency  is  guaranteed  by  an  'invisible  hand',  as
Smith described it. Under this liberal theory of economics the mar-
ket and the price is the organising institution. Private property is
always  favoured  over  common-pool  resources.  Because  they  are
considered as unreliable if their existence depends on the benevol-
ence of their users not to exhaust it. It simply would not be rational
behaviour. Rationality is a necessity under the condition that nearly
every good or resource man needs to survive is scarce. And the
success of a form of economic organisation is determined by the
fact how it copes with this scarcity.
The  utilitarianism  delineates  this  idea  as  the  aim  to  find  the
greatest happiness for as many people as possible. However it is
not meant to find this optimum merely through individual action. It
is  more  an  instruction,  an  advice  for  political  action  (Bentham,
1996).  A regulative  institution is  necessary  to  achieve  that  aim.
Self-interested individual action helps to increase the wealth of a
community, though it does not work as a commons. The maximum
amount of happiness to the maximum amount of people would not
be possible as the danger with the social dilemma exists. For the
utilitarianism a commons has a  complete opposite character.  In-
stead of a regulator (politics) and increasing wealth through self-in-
terested action it has no regulator and the probability of decreasing
wealth through self-interested action.
Even Thomas Aquinas, a theologian from the mediaeval times, can
be interpreted from this point of view. Man is a social being and
has to live in a community where the division of labour is a founda-
tion. Sustaining the peace is the most important task for the com-
munity. Private property ensures the peace. “First because every
man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that
which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the
labour and leave to another that which concerns the community, as
happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, be-
cause human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each
man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself,
whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any
one  thing indeterminately”  (Aquinas,  1947,  2/2  q.  66).  Property
hold in a commons causes disorderliness and disorientates the soci-
ety.
These conceptions worked on the stability of a state or a society.
Peace and stability are supposed to be the highest values for these
systems. And the market is the basis for a dependability. That adds
a social dimension to the economic theory about the 'tragedy of the
commons'.
That phenomenon itself has already been observed by many other
scientists before. But it was Garrett Hardin who gave the name to
it, although he considered it under ecological points of view. He ori-
ginally wrote his article after some thoughts about the problem of
overpopulation and the optimum population size. Hardin described
an old vision of the commons and mainly pictured common-pool re-
sources like pastures which are open to all. Thereby the tragedy of
the commons is an unavoidable destiny. If a resource is open to all,
without any restrictions, everyone will try to gain as much profit as
possible from it. That works as long as the amount of exploiting
people is small enough and the resource won't get exhausted. But if
the number of  users exceeds a certain  level,  the tragedy of the
commons will  occur.  Everyone  still  tries  to  gain  a  maximum of
profit, however the resource is not sufficiently available anymore.
"Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" (Hardin, 2001,
p. 29). Costs will arise because of the unconsidered exhaustion and
have to be borne by the community. For an individual the short-
dated  profit  is  higher  than  the  long-dated  costs.  The  theory
predicates everyone will have a personal loss and contributes to the
ruin of the community. Therefore under these circumstances a lack
of  private  property  and  governance  will  lead  to  a  standstill  of
economic activity and produce considerable disadvantages.
With all these evaluations about common-pool resources in mind,
the question is  why and how commons of  knowledge,  like Open
Source Software, are able to survive. If such a system is doomed to
fail  why  isn't  everything  organised  by  the  apparent  comedy of
private property (Lessig, 1999)? The classical assumption is that a
tragedy of the commons can only be avoided if the common-pool re-
sources will be migrated into private property or if they will be or-
ganised by a central institution, like a  government. With this con-
siderations in mind Open Source Software should not be successful
and fall down. But the opposite happens - it is very vital.
4.) The absence of the tragedy
Economically considered, Open Source Software, as well as know-
ledge or information, share several attributes with a public good
and a commons. It is very interesting to see these systems demon-
strate a strong sustainability and have a vital character. More than
this, Open Source Software shows an innovative, successful and ef-
ficient production mode. What seems to be a phenomenon is easier
to understand if the conditions of existence and production will be
determined. The classical tenet, where the rights of disposal are
the only incentive to innovate and produce a good, does not apply
for the model of Open Source Software. It offers the product (soft-
ware) for free and distributes itself quite easily and fast for that
reason. The conventional presumption is that expenses for imitation
will be lower than the expenses for innovation. Therefore will be no
long-term incentive to innovate. The engine for the growth slows
down (Heller & Nuss, 2004). But the opposite happens. Obviously
the Homo Oeconomicus acts a bit more multifariously.
In order to avoid such a slow-down, a resource like software which
is easy and cheap to distribute and to copy has to be kept in scarce.
By doing this a market value will  be created.  On the other side
there is the innovation model of Open Source Software, which is a
hybrid one (Yuwei Lin, 2005).  It takes place in communities and
firms  and  uses  the  advantages  from  both  sides  to  acquire  re-
sources.  It  is  very  dynamic  and  easily  crosses  the  boundaries
between social  groups.  These socially  created institutions of  de-
velopers and authors provide a sufficient incentive to innovate and
to contribute without a payment.
Of course the situation is a bit more complex. Under these assump-
tions every Open Source project would automatically be successful.
What is needed to explain it more precisely is the theory of network
externalities again. A larger group has a higher probability to suc-
ceed than a smaller group. Although it is actually not the size that
matters, it is their resources and their organisation. Within a larger
groups it is more likely to have a higher number of people or insti-
tutions who reveal a lot of interest and who are able to share their
resources. The challenge is to bring these people together and as-
sure they will have an effect for the collective request (Kuwabara,
2000). It is easier and  more probably for larger groups to establish
such a 'critical mass.'
After such a critical mass has evolved and their contributions boost
the project, it will attract others who want to become involved. The
project is sustainable now and can become successful. The big ad-
vantage Open Source Software has at this point is its close associ-
ation with the internet. It is even more than an association, it can
be better described as a dependency.  Without the internet most
Open Source projects would not exist.  And without the software
from  these  projects,  many  internet  services  would  not  exist  or
would not work as we got used to it. The internet as a technical
network makes it easier for Open Source Software to profit from
economic and social network externalities. It uses the internet as a
basis (e.g. communicating, distributing or marketing) and orient-
ates oneself on whose structure as a part of its own nature. That
helps to achieve the positive externalities and profit from it.
The conception of the critical mass can be interesting within the
context of the ideas from the economist Mancur Olson about the lo-
gic of collective action. He examined the problem groups have if its
members act rationally in the sense of rational choice theory. In
contrast to conventional 'tragedy-of-the-commons-authors' (in fact
his work deals with similar problems) he depicts conditions where
collective action avoids the free-rider problem. This problem occurs
acutely in what he called latent groups. Here, because of the large
size of the group, the contribution of a single group member is not
noticeable anymore. This would be the point where the individual
acts rationally and maximizes its profit by free-riding. That's why it
needs selective incentives (positive or negative) in order to motiv-
ate the members to carry on contributing (Gillinson, 2004). Just to
precise it, the term 'selective' can be understand here as artificially
created by an institution. It is possible to use and to create com-
mon-pool resources without artificial selective incentives if all the
members have the same knowledge about the resource and if a cer-
tain number of participants have such a high interest in that re-
source so they will contribute and give an input (Holtgrewe, 2000).
These people and their input are the critical mass which motivates
others to have a share in the common-pool resource. Here the in-
centives have a social, an 'artless' nature.
If the incentives to sustain Open Source projects as a commons are
mostly socially produced, does it mean everything happens without
economic  self-interest  of  the  developers  or  without  any  rational
choice behaviour at  all?  Is it rational to contribute to these pro-
jects? At the first view it appears as if Open Source Software would
undermine the assumptions about rational choice. But at a closer
inspection there is no necessary contradiction between them. Even
economic theories do not deny the possibility of non-material  in-
centives which can attract people (Cahir, 2003). And evidently in
practice no individual behaves absolutely rational within the eco-
nomic sense. The self-interest as a motivation for  contributing to
Open Source Software is not an exotic phantom. The best evidence
are the plenty of companies who drive a business strategy accord-
ing to that.
That  illustrates the imbalance of the assessment about the com-
mons. In present time, where the idea of common-pool resource has
been upgraded with the commons of knowledge, the evaluation has
to be more complex. It takes more than an unidirectional and eco-
nomical conception of  man.  Human acting is not only leaded by
profit  maximisation.  A merely  Homo Oeconomicus oriented indi-
vidual does not exist.  Additionally men will  be stamped by other
men. Everyone is playing his social roles, the human being as a so-
cial individual (Homo Sociologicus). That's why it is necessary to
consider  economical  as well  as  social  aspects of  human actions.
This  social  character  created  common  measures  and  incentives
which make it possible to manage a common-pool resource. In the
case of Open Source Software it means technological tools will be
guided by social norms, rules or even sanctions.
These norms and rules probably would not be enough to ensure a
trustworthy  legal  basis.  Licences  have  been  constituted  to  give
Open Source Software a juridical framework. Once again we can
recognise here a difference to a classical commons where the abil-
ity to protect the resource with the help of the law was not con-
sidered as an option or it was simply impossible. There are many li-
cences for  such open projects available. The most prominent one
undoubtedly is the GPL. With its clever copyleft construction it se-
cures  the  character  of  openness  for  the  software.  That's  why
Lawrence Lessig described the GPL as a combination of copyright
law and contract law (Lessig, 2002).
With this deliberations in mind it is very interesting to have a look
at other licence models which abandon the option of copyleft. The
Apache  licence  from the  Apache  Software  Foundation  is  a  well
known representative. The assumption would be, if distributors of
Apache software don't have to distribute the source code as well,
every distributor will benefit from it without having to contribute to
it. The innovation will suffer a slow-down. But distributors of soft-
ware are aware about the fact that software is a long-term busi-
ness. No customer will buy software if he has to be afraid about its
future. Especially in the case of a webserver, like the Apache web-
server for instance. For that reason it is rational for a company to
contribute and push the innovation forward if they want to earn
money with it.
If a developer contributes to an Open Source project, he is not giv-
ing up any property rights on his contribution. That is the big con-
tradiction to a public domain product. Actually he shares his intel-
lectual product with others. And nobody can be excluded from us-
ing it. Another difference to the assumption about a classical com-
mon-pool resource appears, as there is no rivalry in consumption.
The digital nature assures that overuse does not emerge. As an as-
tonishing effect the complete opposite happens. Open Source Soft-
ware has the ability to generate positive network externalities from
the increasing number of users instead of suffering overuse from
the increasing number.
It should be clear by now that the theory about the tragedy of the
commons is not adaptable on the commons based system of Open
Source Software. The economical rule, where the tragedy can be
avoided if a) the commons turns into a pure public good, governed
by the state, or if b) it will be  transferred into private ownership,
finds an exception here. Open Source Software is based on a struc-
ture where it benefits from the characteristics of public and private
property while avoiding their failures. Users can be  innovators at
the same time - it has the quality of a collective action, rather than
being a pure resource. Open Source Software does not remain sta-
tionary,  it  is no (scarce) resource. It  is progressing all  the time,
more and more.
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